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Abstract
Islamic symbols have flourished in the public spaces of  Indonesian provincial 
towns after Suharto. This phenomenon has occurred in parallel with the 
significant shifts in the social, economic and political fields, which is tied to 
the mounting impact of  Islamization, social mobility, economic growth, and 
democratization occurring among town people. It is as if  we see a parallel 
move between Islamization, modernization, globalization and democratization. 
Key concepts associated with these trends are appropriated with those rooted 
in tradition and local culture to inform the whole dynamics of  Indonesian 
provincial towns today. The key player in this process is the new middle class, 
who look to Islam for inspiration both to claim distinction and social status and 
to legitimize their consumptive lifestyle. They are newly pious who act as active 
negotiators between the global and the local as well as the cosmopolitan centre 
and the hinterland. They also play a pivotal role as an agency that liberalizes 
religion from its traditionally subservient, passive and docile posture by turning 
it into a source of  moral legitimacy and distinction to represent a modern form 
of  life. Given its intimate relationship with locality, tradition, modernity as well 
as globalization, Islam has increasingly assumed a greater importance for local 
politics. Political elites have used Islamic symbols for the instrumental purpose 
of  extending their political legitimacy and mobilizing constituency support, in 
a political environment of  open competition and increased public participation 
in decision making. In this process religious symbols have irrefutably been 
distanced from their religious moorings and narrow, Islamist understandings, 
in favor of  pragmatic political purposes.
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A. Introduction
In parallel with the rapid process of  globalization Indonesia has 
seen major transformations. These include a greater sense of  autonomy 
for both men and women, and the emergence of  a public sphere in 
which politics and religion are subtly intertwined. Mass education and 
mass communication have facilitated an awareness in Muslims of  the 
need to reconfigure the nature of  religious thought and action, create 
new forms of  public space, and encourage debate over meaning. Within 
this context Islam has become the subject of  dialogue and civil debate. 
Open contests over the use of  the symbolic language of  Islam and its 
meanings have increasingly shaped this new sense of  public space that 
is discursive, performative, and participative. The appearance of  “public 
Islam” in the Muslim world has coincided with the emergence of  a 
new middle class which involves itself  in the debates about objectifying 
Islam. This class is mainly distinguished by the capacity of  its individuals 
and households to accrue surplus income, beyond that needed for the 
necessities of  life. Their rising demands for a more nuanced lifestyle led 
them to adopt Islamic symbols as a mode of  modern cultural expression 
in public spaces. Islamic symbols provide a sense of  legitimacy and moral 
value for members of  the new middle class, and a means by which its 
members’ social identities are formed.
The trend of  metropolitan, urban, middle class Indonesians 
adopting Islamic symbols to claim distinction and moral legitimacy for 
their consumptive lifestyle has resonated through Indonesian Islam, 
and profoundly impacted the dynamics in provincial towns. Due to the 
development of  massive infrastructure and the advancement of  mass 
communication, the boundaries of  big cities and provincial ones have 
become increasingly blurred. Trends that develop in the big cities easily 
progress to provincial ones. However, these trends do not just develop. 
They are not only adapted and used in appropriation with the local 
context, but also modify and are modified in turn by pre-existing trends in 
the provincial towns. The process of  appropriation also involves agency, 
acting to determine the form of  Islam that will prevail in the provincial 
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town’s public spaces. The role of  the middle class has been crucial as an 
agency facilitating the burgeoning of  a new form of  market-friendly piety, 
which accepts the idioms of  modern democracy. It is noteworthy that 
the familiarity of  society with its roots and culture also demands a strong 
legitimacy from history and culture itself. This is because institutional 
symbols of  traditional religion often resurface and require affirmation 
from religious actors, who in turn, have sought sources of  legitimacy in 
their effort to offer Islam in provincial public spaces.
This paper is aimed at analysing the changing landscape of  
Indonesian provincial towns marked by the mushrooming of  religious 
symbols that has occurred in tandem with the emergence of  a new middle 
class which has become aware of  the importance of  religious identity for 
their social status and lifestyle. It looks at the extent to which Islamization 
has gained a foothold and the peculiar modernization it produced. 
One of  the most salient features of  the relation between tradition and 
modernization in provincial town life is Islam’s location at the centre of  
town values and activities. It constitutes the most pivotal point in the 
complex dynamics of  the negotiation between tradition and modernity. 
This paper thus also examines the way in which the middle class plays 
a pivotal role as an agency facilitating the growth of  public Islam in 
provincial Indonesia where ideas about locality, tradition, modernization 
and globalization as well as ideas about Islam’s significance for town public 
life are mutually reinforcing. Finally, it looks at the extent to which Islam 
has contributed to the recent dynamics of  local politics in Indonesia.
B. Islamization in Town
In a country like Indonesia, in political, economic, cultural, and 
administrative matters, the town plays an intermediary role between the 
cosmopolitan centres and the hinterland. It serves as a meeting point 
and mediator between the outward-reaching national (and global) culture, 
institutions, and processes on the one side and the increasingly self-
assertive agricultural village majority on the other. Unlike cosmopolitan 
centres, where there is greater sociocultural differentiation, towns seeks 
to manage tension between the global and the local more smoothly. The 
tension is often more explicit than that in the cosmopolitan centres, but 
it is held in check by cross-cutting personal ties. The global is spread 
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through modern political, education, economic and cultural institutions. 
Its legitimacy is however bolstered by means of  the assimilation of  key 
concepts associated with the global with tradition and local culture. 
Looking at Indonesia from provincial towns allows us to understand how 
the local, the cosmopolitan, and the global have intertwined in informing 
multiple manifestations of  the complex relationship between the political, 
the economic, the social, the cultural and the religious.
This is not ungrounded theory. It does not take many minutes 
of  conversation to start to see how provincial towns seek to manage 
tension between the global and the local by means of  appropriation and 
harmonization. This phenomenon is evident in Kebumen, the market and 
administrative centre for a district bearing the same name, located in the 
southern part of  Central Java. This town has vast hectares of  lush paddy 
fields that yield around 150,000 tonnes of  rice per year. Ironically, based 
on the data from ‘penerima bantuan langsung tunai (BLT)’ literally translated 
as the ‘recipients of  direct cash assistance’, in 2007, 46 percent of  its 
population still lived in poverty. When I carried out research for this paper 
in 2007-2008, Kebumen was led by district head (Bupati) Rustriningsih and 
her deputy, Nashiruddin al-Mansur. It was the fourth poorest kabupaten 
(regency) of  the 35 regencies and cities of  Central Java. In addition, more 
than 17,000 people were illiterate and 13,957 children aged between 7 
and 15 years were not enrolled in school. The school drop-out rate was 
also very high. It has been reported that more than 66,000 people have 
not completed their primary education. The high numbers of  illiterate 
people and school dropouts explain why 96,024 families in Kebumen 
(or 30.43 percent) are classified as ‘pre-prosperous’ and 75,052 families 
(23.78 percent) are in the socio-economic status group ‘pre-prosperous 
1’. More shockingly, 35,311 people, from a total of  315,591 people in 
the productive age group, were unemployed. The high unemployment 
rate is correlated with the fact that a huge number of  Kebumen workers 
have migrated for greener pastures abroad.1
Despite its claimed status as a santri town (kota santri) with 99 
percent of  its population being Muslims, Kebumen had never strongly 
supported Islamic parties. No Islamic party had won a majority since the 
1 For a comparison, see the annual report by the Regional Development Planning 
Board of  Kebumen, Kebumen dalam Angka 2006 (Kebumen: Bappeda, 2006). 
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first elections in 1955. However, kyai, traditional ‘ulama in Java, do have an 
important cultural influence in Kebumen. The latest data show that the 
district has 121 pesantren, traditional Islamic boarding schools led by kyai. 
These religious leaders have long held a special position in the Kebumen 
community, as reported by sociologist, Jennifer Alexander, during her 
observations in the 1980s. Her research primarily examined economic 
development, and took place in a district located to the east of  Kebumen. 
She concluded that Clifford Geertz’s characterization of  Javanese society 
as being divided into santri, abangan and priyayi groups was not relevant 
in Kebumen. Geertz’s santri group practice orthodox Islam, while the 
abangan population practice a more syncretic, Javanese flavoured version. 
The priyayi are drawn from the traditional Javanese aristrocratic class, and 
often hold responsible administrative positions. According to Alexander, 
in Kebumen people tended to reject the santri/abangan distinction and 
the trichotomy santri/abangan/priyayi. They generally pictured themselves 
as Muslims with a firm commitment to Indonesian nationalism.2 Unlike 
other orthodox santri, who stress the formalization of  religious expression 
and the pursuit of  piety and orthopraxy, the majority of  the population 
Alexander described were able to strike a compromise between Islam, 
traditional values and indigenous culture.
Kebumen is probably better pictured as a place where Islamic-
Javanese moderate practices prevail and abangan beliefs are still alive. The 
military has described several isolated districts in Kebumen as ‘red spots’, 
once under Communist influences. Kebumen has also been described 
as a ‘tinderbox’, or a place where both the political extreme left and 
extreme right can both be found. In 1950, a religious rebellion exploded 
in Kebumen as a consequence of  rationalization within the body of  the 
Indonesian Republic Armed Forces. This rebellion was led by a local 
militant leader, Machfudz Abdurrahman, the owner of  the Al-Kahfi 
Islamic boarding school in Sumolangu and more popularly known as 
Kyai Sumolangu. He refused to merge with ‘The Lemah Abang Battalion’ 
formed by the army. Instead, he formed his own battalion known as the 
Chimayatul Islam. Unfortunately negotiations between the Kyai and the 
army ended in disagreement, and as a result a confrontation with the 
2 Jennifer Alexander, Trade, Traders and Trading in Rural Java (Singapore: Oxford 
University Press. 1987), p. 16.
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army was inevitable.3 Given this historical peculiarity, the highest political 
position in Kebumen was always reserved for army officials.
Only recently have Islamic forces and secular power reached a 
point of  convergence in Kebumen. A huge billboard in front of  the 
regent’s official residence on Kebumen’s main square shows Rustriningsih 
wearing a trendy colourful headscarf. Her (male) deputy Nashiruddin 
wears a green turban. Islamic symbols have replaced Javanese insignia 
as the tools of  political communication. Islamic nuances are being 
strikingly incorporated into the bureaucratic sphere elsewhere as well. 
As is occurring at the national level, more and more female civil servants 
in Kebumen are wearing headscarves and becoming involved in regular 
religious activities organised by the region’s government units. Arabic 
maxims promoting efficiency and transparency are scattered around the 
walls of  local government offices. The increasingly conspicuous religious 
symbols in Kebumen’s public places reflect the sustained penetration of  
Islamic orthodoxy into the heart of  this abangan culture and its attempts to 
move towards full integration as part of  a modern, globalizing Indonesia.
As in other mid-sized Javanese towns, Islamic proselytising (da‘wa) 
groups have grown more active in Kebumen over the years. Young 
people are at their core. Their goal is to formalise religious expressions 
and introduce a more orthodox version of  Islam into Kebumen society. 
Notable among them are the Hidayatullah group, which is under the 
auspices of  al-Iman Foundation, and the PKS, which coordinates the 
Ibnu Abbas, the Perempuan Muslimah, and the Iqra Club Foundation. 
Both groups set up education institutions and introduced what they call 
integrated-Islamic schools, in which the younger generation of  Muslims 
are taught to internalize the principle of  Islam’s totality. These schools are 
founded on the belief  that the future of  Indonesia lies in the commitment 
of  Muslim youth to consistently follow the example of  the Prophet 
Muhammad and the first generation of  Muslims ( Salaf  al-Salih - pious 
ancestors).4 One impact (among many) of  the da‘wa activities organized 
3 Several degree holders believe that AUI has connections with Gerakan Pembe-
rontakan DI/TII (Rebellion Movement) that is led by Kartosuwirjo. For more informa-
tion on AUI, please refer to Singgih Tri Sulistiyono, Pemberontakan Angkatan Umat Islam 
(AUI) di Kebumen 1950 (Semarang: Mimbar, 2000). 
4 Interview with Muhammad Yunus and Abdullah Munir, the Chairman of  al-
Iman Foundation and the Headmaster of  SDIT al-Madinah respectively, Kebumen, 
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by the Iqra Club is that 90 per cent of  female students at SMU 1 and 
SMK 1, Kebumen’s preferred senior high schools, now wear headscarves. 
The penetration of  the new da‘wa groups was not totally unexpected. 
Mainstream Muslim groups, such as NU and Muhammadiyah, had long 
expressed concern about the weak religiosity and domination of  abangan 
culture in isolated villages in several of  Kebumen’s sub-districts, such 
as Sempor, Buayan, Karangsambung, and Mirit. Although many ‘ulama 
and religious teachers were aware that the new ultra-orthodox da‘wa 
groups might challenge their established religious practices and give new 
expression to their faith, they generally welcomed them as partners in the 
struggle for the glorification of  Islam (syi’ar Islam) throughout Kebumen. 
They even acknowledged the creativity of  the way they packaged Islam 
to make it more attractive to the broader Kebumen (or more precisely 
abangan) community.5 Fear of  the way these new da‘wa groups have 
expanded has only recently surfaced as a public concern. The catalyst was 
their systematic campaign to infiltrate schools, many of  which belonged 
to Muhammadiyah, to recruit Muhammadiyah youths into their cause. A 
number of  the Muhammadiyah faithful openly challenged the expansion 
of  puritan da’wa into their education institutions, in Kebumen town 
itself  as well as in its sub-districts of  Gombong, Kutowinangun, Sadang, 
Pejagoan and Karanganyar.6
The growth of  Islam’s public visibility can also be seen strikingly 
in Martapura, the capital town of  Banjar regency, which is located 40 
km to the north of  Banjarmasin, the capital city of  South Kalimantan 
province. This regency is divided into 17 sub-regencies with 288 towns 
and villages. Since its establishment in 1950, the Banjar regency’s head 
has changed 16 times. The current district head is Khairul Shaleh, and his 
running mate is Muhammad Hatim Salman. According to 2006 statistical 
data, the total population was 464.148, comprised of  238,162 men and 
225,986 women. The most densely populated area was the district capital, 
Martapura, with 2,042 people per square kilometre. School participation 
17 October 2007.
5 Interview with Bambang Purwanto, Islamic teacher and staff  at the Regional 
Department of  Religious Affairs in Kebumen, Kebumen, 16 October 2007.
6 Interview with Muhammad Dahsyad, a member of  the Education Council 
of  Muhammadiyah in Kebumen, and Muhammad Abduh Hisyam, the Secretary of  
Muhammadiyah in Kebumen, 12 October 2007.
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has increased over time with increases in the number of  schools. Currently 
there are 350 primary schools, 39 junior high schools, and 9 senior high 
schools under the auspices of  the National Department of  Education. 
The total number of  students is 55,269. In addition to this, there are 
217 schools at all levels under the Department of  Religious Affairs, with 
26,872 students. There are 459,124 Muslims, compared to 314 Protestants, 
209 Catholics, 101, Hindus, and 98 Buddhists and others. Based on the 
same statistic data, there were 2,118 job applicants in 2006, many of  
whom held senior high school diplomas. From this number, 1,136 were 
reportedly absorbed in various job markets and positions.7
The close identification of  Martapura with Islam can be traced 
back to its historical trajectory as the capital city of  the Banjar Sultanate 
before the Dutch ruined it in the war of  1859-63. There, ‘ulama (religious 
scholars) played a pivotal role in politics. Muhammad Arshad al-Banjari, a 
charismatic ‘ulama in the nineteenth century, was the first Grand Mufti of  
the Banjar Sultanate, under Sultan Adam’s rule between 1825 and 1857. 
As Grand Mufti he integrated the shari‘a into the political structure of  
the Banjar Sultanate, and was responsible for issuing the Sultan Adam 
Law (Undang-Undang Sultan Adam) stipulating application of  various 
aspects of  the shari‘a, especially the ritual (‘ibada) and the social contract 
(mu‘amala), in accordance with Shafi‘ite legal doctrines. This historical 
trajectory explains the identity of  Martapura as a town that prides itself  
on being the ‘front porch of  Mecca’ in Kalimantan.8 In addition to this, 
close identification of  Martapura with Islam has much to do with the 
self-image of  the Martapuran Muslims, who portray themselves as a pious, 
pleasant and polite society, thus different from the other Banjarese clan 
groups, especially from Upper River (Hulu Sungai).
The presence of  Islamic symbols in the town’s public space was 
noticeable during Abdul Madjid’s leadership of  the Banjar regency in the 
mid-1990s. The Cahaya Bumi Selamat (CBS, the Light of  Saved Earth) 
was built on the site of  the town square, which had long provided a 
7 Interview with Ahmad Rabbani, staff  at the Regional Development Planning 
Board of  the Banjar regency. See also the annual report by the Regional Development 
Planning Board, Kabupaten Banjar Dalam Angka 2006 (Martapura: Pemkab Banjar, 2006).
8 Rudy Ariffin, “Martapura Bumi Serambi Mekkah,” in Nurhudianto (ed.), 
Martapura Bumi Serambi Mekkah, Secunting Pemikiran Rudy Ariffin (Martapura: Pemkab 
Banjar, 2004), pp. 33-5.
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community public space for Martapuran society. CBS is a jewellery trading 
centre. The vast building is in the architectural style of  the Middle East, 
and at its centre a huge monument stands tall, complete with beautiful 
Arabic calligraphy. The overall effect is that of  a magnificent, stunningly 
beautiful palace. It is a prestigious project intended to enhance the image 
of  Martapura as a town built on jewellery, as well as the front porch of  
Mecca. The image of  Middle-Eastern architecture dominating the main 
landscape of  the Martapura town clearly illustrates the deep penetrating 
forces of  Islam. During the time of  Abdul Madjid’s leadership, the 
Sekumpul Religious Study Group emerged and rapidly grew to become 
a religious, political, economic, and social magnet for Martapuran society 
and Muslims in South Kalimantan in general. This study group was 
founded in the early 1990s by Zaini Gani, better known as Guru Zaini, 
a charismatic cleric who decided to move from his old residence in 
Keraton sub-district to live in Sekumpul. At that time Sekumpul was a 
quiet, desolate area, full of  karamunting trees. The presence of  Sekumpul 
is emblematic of  the growing importance of  Islam in Martapura’s public 
sphere. As a provincial town located outside Java which sees itself  as 
marginalized in the highly centralized national development, Martapura 
has drawn strength from Islamic symbols to reinforce its local identity, 
and thereby negotiate its position in the face of  the central government.
Realities after 9/11 have led many observers to see the sprouting 
of  religious symbols in the public spaces of  Indonesian provincial 
towns as indicative of  the success of  Islamism in changing the whole 
landscape of  Indonesian Islam. Largely defined as the political discourse 
and activism that aims to Islamize the secular system of  society and state 
by exploiting religious symbols and identities, Islamism is perceived as 
posing a serious challenge to the existing secular democratic system of  
Indonesia and even spreading the threat of  terrorism. The same observers 
imagine a bleak future for Indonesia, one that may be no different from 
Pakistan or even Iraq today, countries that are gradually being sucked 
into a maelstrom of  political and religious violence. Obviously, this sort 
of  alarmist perspective has failed to capture the dynamics and realities 
occurring in post-Suharto Indonesia, where the mushrooming of  religious 
symbols is also coupled with the rise of  a new middle class and the 
growth of  democracy. This new reality is characterised by flourishing 
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political activities based on electoral politics within the framework of  a 
democratic system. Despite criticism from some sceptics who still judge 
Indonesia’s emergent democracy as superficial, based on the assumption 
that it remains procedural rather than functional, and driven by political 
money and manipulation, one cannot deny that the electoral democratic 
system evolving in Indonesia today is rooted in the opening of  political 
opportunity bolstered by certain levels of  social mobility, economic 
growth, and broader participation in education and politics. The driving 
force behind this phenomenon is the middle class who, particularly in 
the context of  Indonesian provincial towns, act as negotiators between 
the global and the local as well as the cosmopolitan centre and the 
hinterland. In their attempts to boost their identity and social status, the 
middle class is at the forefront in calling for the compatibility between 
Islam and modern values such as democracy, tolerance, and human 
rights, thus playing a significant role in the process of  Islamization and 
democratization as well.
C. Middle Class and Lifestyle
Earlier debates on Indonesia’s middle class paid scant attention to 
Muslim groups, but recognized their existence as one of  the drivers of  
change, together with the entrepreneurial and professional intermediate 
groups and the officer corps. However given the antagonistic relations 
between Suharto’s New Order and Islam, Muslim groups tended to 
be excluded from the circles privileged to benefit from this change, 
circles which included entrepreneurs, professionals and military political 
managers. These groups shared a common interest not only in preserving 
their acquired comfort and status, but also in restraining Islamic political 
claims.9 Historically speaking, Islamic political forces had long been the 
9 Daniel S. Lev, “Intermediate Classes and Change in Indonesia: Some Initial 
Reflections,” in Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young, eds, The Politics of  Middle Class 
Indonesia (Clayton, Australia: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, 1990), pp. 25-43. Lev’s 
analysis received a critical remark from Liddle who saw growing interests among the 
larger modern urban business persons and professionals of  various kinds as well as 
urban lower classes such as rich rice farmers, producers of  various agricultural com-
modities and even devout Muslims to trade their dependence for a larger share of  the 
benefits of  state largesse. See R. William Liddle, “The Middle Class and New Order 
Legitimacy: A Response to Dan Lev,” in Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young, eds, The 
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main opponent of  the bureaucracy, standing on the front line to challenge 
secular power.10
The failure of  Islamic political forces to make Islam a formal part 
of  the state system served as a catalyst for the emergence of  a Muslim 
middle class, centred around professionals, civil servants, intellectuals, 
and military officers.11 They came from santri-priyayi families, in the 
Geertzian paradigm, who sent their sons and daughters to modern 
schools and through this route propelled them into various economic 
bureaucratic sectors. In this way they became professionals in both state 
and private companies, expert staff  assisting government ministers, 
members of  parliament, director generals, heads of  sub-directorates 
and many other strategic positions in the bureaucracy. This process of  
embourgeoisement or priyanization, in Aswab Mahasin’s term, led the 
santri professionals to see Islam no longer as an alternative to the existing 
system, but rather as the inspirational base for a national, democratic 
framework for society.12 The inclusion of  santri in the bureaucracy and 
civil services in turn contributed to the New Order’s marked shift toward 
accommodating Islam in politics, shown by Suharto’s personal support for 
the establishment of  the Association of  Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals 
(ICMI, Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia) in 1990. As a consequence 
of  these changes in Indonesia’s political environment, Muslim political 
groups have increasingly become the main patrons of  the state, complete 
with a ‘greening’ process in the House of  Representatives and the cabinet. 
From within the state system the Muslim middle class struggled to give 
Islam a central role in politics by repudiating the goal of  an Islamic state, 
mobilizing ecumenical religious support, promoting women’s rights and 
Politics of  Middle Class Indonesia (Clayton, Australia: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, 
1990), pp. 49-58. 
10 See Allan Samson, Islam and Politics in Indonesia (Berkeley: University of  Cali-
fornia Press, 1972); see also Kuntowijoyo, “Serat Cebolek dan Mitos Pembangkangan 
Islam: Melacak Asal-Usul Ketegangan antara Islam dan Birokraso,” Ulumul Qur’an 5, 
1 (1990), pp. 63-72. 
11 Abdurrahman Wahid, “Indonesia’s Muslim Middle Class: An Imperative or a 
Choice?” in Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young, eds, The Politics of  Middle Class Indonesia 
(Clayton, Australia: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, 1990), pp. 22-24.
12 Aswab Mahasin, “The Santri Middle Class: An Insider’s View,” in Richard 
Tanter and Kenneth Young, eds, The Politics of  Middle Class Indonesia (Clayton, Australia: 
Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, 1990), pp. 138-144.
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championing Islam-based democratic ideals.13
Fluctuations in Islam’s political relationship with the state inform 
both the dynamics and the formation of  the Indonesian middle class 
vis-à-vis the state, making it difficult to identify the main characteristic of  
the class from a purely political perspective. The ‘cultural capital’ held 
by the middle class provides a foundation for the emergence of  civil 
society associated with demands for representative space in political 
institutions. However, the middle class also has an interest in maintaining 
law and order, political stability and material prosperity, which may lead 
to their support for authoritarianism.14 Beyond political parameters, 
one can identify the Indonesian middle class by its performance in the 
public sphere and its consumer-based lifestyle. Dick reminded us of  the 
importance of  the mode of  consumption as a defining characteristic 
of  the Indonesian middle class.15 This argument seems plausible, 
since the ‘mode of  consumption’ can be seen not only as a cultural 
representation of  a class, but also a political statement. Consumption 
practices, though overwhelmingly apolitical in intent, have significant 
political consequences.16 To a large part the mode of  consumption and 
13 Arif  Budiman, “From Lower to Middle Class: Political Activities Before and 
After 1988,” in David Bourchier and John Legge (eds.), Democracy in Indonesia 1950s 
and 1990s (Sidney: Centre of  Southeast Asian Studies at Monash University, 1994), 
pp. 289-235; A. Syafi’i Anwar, Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia. Sebuah Kajian Politik 
tentang Cendikiawan Muslim Orde Baru (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995); see also Robert W. 
Hefner, Civil Islam, Muslim and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2000).
14 Garry Rodan, “Theorising political Opposition in East and Southeast Asia,” 
in Garry Rodan, ed., Political Oppositions in Industrializing Asia (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1996), pp. 1-39; see also Johan Saravanamuttu, “In There a Politics of  the 
Malaysian Middle Class? in Abdul Rahman Embong, ed., Southeast Asian Middle Classes. 
Prospects for Social Change and Democratisation (Bangi: UKM Press, 2001), pp. 103-118. For 
the case of  Indonesia, see Ariel Heryanto, “Indonesian Middle-Class Oppositon in the 
1990s,” in Garry Rodan, ed., Political Oppositions in Industrializing Asia (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 241-271.
15 H.W. Dick, “The Rise of  a Middle Class and the Changing Concept of  Eq-
uity in Indoesia—An Interpretation,” Indonesia 39: 71-91. This argument is repeated in 
his “Further Reflections on the Middle Class,” in Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young 
(eds.), The Politics of  Middle Class Indonesia (Clayton, Australia: Centre for Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1990), pp. 63-70.
16 Ken Young, “Consumption, Social Differentiation and Self-Definition of  
the New Rich,” in Michael Pinches, Culture and Privilege in Capitalist Asia, London: 
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lifestyle of  the educated urban middle class inspired the image of  modern 
Indonesia promoted on the nation’s television screens and through 
government broadcasts, and exemplified by the nation’s leaders. The 
growth of  the urban middle class itself  is paralleled by the increasingly 
popular acceptance of  consumer patterns associated with modernization.17
A sense of  personalized Muslimhood has developed out of  this 
context, which allows the middle class to demonstrate their religious 
identity through bodily purchased practices and goods.18 This model of  
Muslimhood is indubitably associated with their attempts to construct 
new narratives of  themselves and their place in the world from creative 
blends of  their own cultural inheritance and global influences.19 In 
the words of  Göle, the Muslimhood model has enabled Muslims to 
experience the ‘banalization process.’ Actors from diverse backgrounds 
are involved in shaping the face of  Islam in the public space and entering 
into the modern urban space with little hesitance. By using global 
communication networks they participate in public debates, track patterns 
of  consumption and study the rules of  the market, while at the same 
time embracing individualistic, professional and consumerist values.20
Seen from this perspective Islamic symbols seem significant to 
class mobility and the formation of  the new middle class. In contrast 
to the old bourgeoisie, the new middle class, according to Bourdieu, 
no longer prioritizes the ascetic ethic of  production and accumulation, 
but favours a morality of  consumption based on credit, spending and 
enjoyment. They live in a social world driven by a new economy which 
Routledge, 1999. p. 57.
17 Patrick Guinness, “Local Society and Culture,” in Hal Hill, ed., Indonesia’s 
New Order. The Dynamics of  Socio-economic Transformation (Honolulu: University of  Hawaii 
Press, 1994), pp. 285-286.
18 Jenny B. White, “The End of  Islamism? Turkey’s Muslimhood Model,” in 
Robert W. Hefner (ed.), Remaking Muslim Politics (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University 
Press, 2005), pp. 87-111; Asef  Bayat, Making Islam Democratic, Social Movements and the 
Post-Islamist Turn (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007).
19 Ariel Heryanto, “The Years of  Living Luxuriously. Identity Politics of  Indo-
nesia’s New Rich,” in Michael Pinches, ed., Culture and Privilege in Capitalist Asia (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 159-187.
20 Nilufer Göle, “Islamic Visibilities and Public Sphere,” in Nilufer Göle dan 
Ludwig Ammann (eds.), Islam in Public Turkey, Iran, and Europe (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi 
University Press, 2006), pp. 3-43.
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judges people by their capacity for consumption, their standard of  living 
and their lifestyle, as much as by their capacity for production.21 Bourdieu’s 
scheme associates the new middle class with symbolic consumption 
and post-modernity. This allows us to investigate the new middle class’s 
conception of  lifestyle in relation to its habitus, and its concern to expand 
and legitimate its own particular dispositions and way of  life.22 The nexus 
between habitus, consumption, and lifestyle proposed by Bourdieu is 
central to the new middle class’s strengthening of  its symbolic capital, 
with its promotion of  cultural forms other than those enshrined in 
traditional middle class virtues, and thus its struggle with the traditional 
middle class. To be sure, in Bourdieu’s quite distinct definition of  class, 
cultural factors are seen to operate alongside economic ones.
As a matter of  fact, the rising consciousness of  the new Muslim 
middle class of  the importance of  Islamic symbols, with its willingness 
to engage in debate and objectify religion, looked to the availability of  
religious space within the urban landscape of  metropolitan and big 
cities. In view of  the growing demands for such space, government and 
business offices built mosques and musallas, small places to pray. Elite 
housing complexes and shopping centres provided meeting places for 
listening to public lectures on Islam (majlis ta‘lim). Convention centres and 
five star hotels advertised venues for religious programmes and Islamic 
study packages. Luxury Islamic centres, with a large mosque as the main 
building surrounded by training and education buildings, shops, and a 
hotel, have been built on large tracts of  land in major cities like Jakarta, 
Surabaya, and Makassar. The new Muslim middle class comes to these 
places to engage in reciting the Qur’an, chanting dhikr (the profession 
of  the faith), and the like, while discussing various aspects of  Islam. In 
this way Indonesian Islam has experienced a process of  gentrification, 
favouring global high-technology and consumerist Islamic appetites.23 
While da‘wa has somehow become urbanized, new creative agents and 
21 P. Bourdieu, Distinction. A Social Critique of  the Judgement of  Taste (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), p. 310.
22 M. Featherstone, “Lifestyle and Consumer Culture,” in E. Meijer, ed., Everyday 
Life: Leisure and Culture (Tilburg: Department of  Leisure Studies University of  Tilburg, 
1987), p. 158.
23 Mona Abaza, “Markets of  Faith: Jakarta Da‘wa and Islamic Gentrification,” 
Archipel 67 (2004): 173-202.
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young, popular preachers have emerged to work in both public and 
private settings. They offer a variety of  innovative da‘wa programmes 
which attract the interests of  the new middle class.
The backdrop to this phenomenon was the Islamic revival that 
has swept across Indonesia since the 1980s, and has had a profound 
effect on the urban middle classes’ rising demands for Islamic symbols 
as a mode of  modern cultural expression in public spaces.24 Islamic 
symbols function as a source for middle class attempts to construct new 
narratives of  themselves and their place in the world through practices of  
distinction. The distinctions made in different areas of  everyday life are 
drawn from history, memory, friendship, consumption, and recreational 
practices; their inspirations come from multiple sources. The symbols 
themselves are subject to negotiation with the habitus of  the class. In 
this way Islam has been transformed into a symbol of  modernism and 
even elitism, and become part of  a lifestyle. For instance the baju kurung 
(traditional modest attire of  women) and mini telekung (outermost robe 
worn by women when praying), increasingly popular among Malaysia’s 
Muslim middle class, are imbued with Islamic religiosity, whilst modesty, 
discipline and control are upheld. There is some experimentation here, 
symbolized by the exploration of  mobility and gender identity of  middle 
class Malay society.25 Being most forcefully subjected to intensified Islamic 
requirements, women developed “a strategic knowledge of  dressing as a 
particular form of  Islamic consumption, situated between public display 
of  class and covering the body”.26
A similar pattern of  social differentiation is evident among the 
middle class in Martapura. Over time the fascination with Guru Zaini and 
the Sekumpul teaching complex has resulted in thousands of  middle class 
people from Martapura town and other South Kalimantan cities migrating 
to the Sekumpul area.27 They built houses around the seven houses owned 
24 Moeflich Hasbullah, “Cultural Presentation of  the Muslim Middle Class in 
Contemporary Indonesia,” Studia Islamika 7, 2 (2000), pp, 1-58. 
25 Johan Fischer, Proper Islamic Consumption, Shopping Among the Malays in Modern 
Malaysia (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2008), p. 79. 
26 Ibid., p. 82.
27 Zain Alhakim, “The Sekumpul of  ‘Diamond’ Master Teacher,” in Asrori S 
Karni, ed., A Celebration of  Democracy A Journalistic Portrayal of  Indonesia’s 2004 Direct Elec-
tions Amongst Moderate and Hardline Muslims (Jakarta: Era Media Informasi, The Wahid 
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by Guru Zaini and his relatives, in the same row as the Al-Raudhah, the 
‘Kompleks Dalam Regol’ (Complex in the Archway). The Sekumpul complex 
has inspired the Martapuran community to engage in the cultivation of  
culture and social refinement. Trends made popular by the followers of  
the Sekumpul religious study group have a wide influence. The trends 
that originate and are developed there are taken up in Martapura and 
other towns in South Kalimantan. For instance, the trend for men to wear 
the koko shirt and the white kopiah (a kind of  rimless cap), and for long 
dresses and colourful jilbabs for women originated at Sekumpul, has now 
become very popular in South Kalimantan. Sekumpul’s role as a lifestyle 
trendsetter for South Kalimantan’s provincial cities has evolved naturally.
Owning a home in the luxurious category in Sekumpul automatically 
privileges a person to become part of  the Sekumpul community. The 
spatial and social distance between houses is very close, thanks to 
Sekumpul’s TV, which features religious programs from the Dalam Regol. 
The TV programs helped everybody living in the houses strengthen their 
communal feeling as members of  the Sekumpul society. These houses 
are alive with activity for four days of  the week, particularly on Friday 
afternoons when people gather to follow the religious activities held in 
the Al-Raudhah. Except for caretakers, after these activities most people 
return to their respective towns and their daily routines as entrepreneurs, 
traders, civil servants and so forth. Some people stay permanently in 
Sekumpul, and partly due to Sekumpul some of  these have been fortunate 
enough to develop extensive business networks, expanding the market 
for their products throughout Southern Kalimantan. People like Sarkani, 
Norhid, and Abdullah Assegaf  have become successful businessmen in 
coal mining, the traditional Banjarese batik industry (sasirangan), precious 
stones and jewels and other large-scale business enterprises in South 
Kalimantan.28 Ismail Morsade is another succesful businessman living 
in Sekumpul. He was originally a Madurese enterpreneur from Sampit, 
Central Kalimantan, who decided to migrate to Sekumpul during the 
Institute and the Asia Foundation, 2006), pp. 91-95.
28 Alfisyah, “Agama dan Tingkah Laku Ekonomi Urang Banjar, Studi atas Peda-
gang Sekumpul Martapura Kalimantan Selatan,” Unpublished MA Thesis (Yogyakarta: 
Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2005).
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bloody ethno-religious Madurese/Dayak conflict in the late 1990s.29 
For Morsade, Sekumpul is not only a place to enjoy the overwhelming 
atmosphere of  Islamic spirituality associated with Guru Zaini, who helped 
him overcome the emotional trauma of  the conflict. It is also a place 
that offers socio-political-religious protection, and a promising area to 
develop his business activities in South Kalimantan.30
The religious symbolic meanings surrounding Sekumpul have seen 
prosperity flourish. Gradually, through its complex role at the intersection 
of  multifaceted religio-political and economic activities, Sekumpul has 
come to be seen as as the ‘kampung urang sugih’ (village of  the affluent) 
of  South Kalimantan. As a spiritual market, Sekumpul is more than just 
a site for religious ceremonies and rituals. It has become a new source 
of  religious and moral guidance. More importantly, it has also become 
a medium for religious middle-class consumers in South Kalimantan’s 
towns to seek new identity and personal meaning – by consuming. At 
Sekumpul they can enjoy spiritual support from Guru Zaini, but after 
that they can shop for all the accessories and gadgets associated with the 
Sekumpul. Most people do not hesitate to spend millions of  Rupiah for 
an exclusive Mushab Al-Quran (Qur’anic edition) signed by Guru Zaini, 
a Tasbih Fuqah (a type of  rosary) or a Sekumpul-stamped Rihal Jati (a 
small teak table to put the Qur’an on). Many collectors buy the jilbab 
and kopiah haji sold in the Sekumpul.31 Slowly, Sekumpul has developed 
its own unique brand identity, sought after by its own middle-class 
market segment of  loyal customers. Possessing Sekumpul merchandise 
and accessories allows a person to undeniably claim membership in 
Sekumpul’s middle class community.
D. Commodification
The growing interest of  the new middle class in the current wave 
of  market-friendly Islam has spread to a large and diverse segment of  
29 For a further account on ethno-religious conflicts in Sampit and other 
provincial towns during the late 1990s, see Gerry van Klinken, Communal Violence and 
Democratization in Indonesia. Small Town Wars (London and New York: Routledge, 2009).
30 Interview with Ismail Morsade, Martapura, 20 February 2008.
31 Interview with Nafsiah, religious figure who resides in Sekumpul Neighbor-
hood, 11 February 2008; and Dede Hidayatullah, civil servant who also resides in 
Sekumpul, 22 February 2008.
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Indonesian Muslims, leading to the expansion of  market opportunities 
for commercial products related to these activities. It is logical that while 
demands have increased for the latest innovative models of  religious 
expression, Indonesian fashion designers, the garment industry and other 
business players gear up to launch new products. Again, the middle class 
plays a pivotal role, not only as loyal consumers of  the products, but 
also as commercial agents providing affordable ‘Islamic’ products that 
follow (or even set) the latest fashion trends. As commercial agents, they 
distribute the products widely to reach remote areas in the countryside. 
Indeed, their roles as commercial agents in the process of  religious 
commodification cannot be ignored. Religious commodification should 
not be confused with commercialization. It is not a phenomenon that 
exists solely to make money. Religious commodification entails the 
ideologization of  commodities and the commoditization of  religion, as it 
is as much about selling ideology as it is about selling products.32 Religious 
commodification has in fact very much to do with the way religion, in 
this case Islam, is packaged and offered to a broader audience, and how 
this has produced a framework for the moral order of  society through 
the objectification and systematization of  Islamic values and practices 
as a normative model.
Middle class entrepreneurs are at the forefront in transforming 
Islam into a symbolic commodity relevant to class-based demands for 
lifestyle, modesty and enjoyment, and therefore no longer simply a set 
of  rituals, beliefs and doctrines. Sociological debate of  this phenomenon 
conceptualises consumption in the modern age as one of  the most 
crucial, defining class experiences, and an expression of  identity and 
representation of  the self. This is related to the notion of  embodiment 
which suggests that ”all the fundamental processes of  conception, 
perception, evaluation and judgement are connected to the fact that 
human beings are embodied social agents.”33 Since religion has emerged 
as a symbol of  elitism associated with the road to success, statements of  
one’s personal identity can involve the use and consumption of  religious 
32 Ronald Lukens-Bull, “Commodification of  Religion and the ‘Religification’ 
of  Commodities,” in Pattana Kitiarsa (ed.), Religious Commodifications in Asia: Marketing 
Goods (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 220-234.
33 Bryan S. Turner, “Preface,” in Parci Falk, The Consuming Body (London: Sage 
Publications, 1994).
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symbols, as can be seen in the role of  Islam within the Indonesian public 
sphere. In the hands of  middle class entrepreneurs, the symbols of  
faith have thus become commodified as markers of  social status. Miller 
suggested that commodifying religion has reduced religious beliefs, 
symbols, and values into free-floating signifiers to be consumed like 
anything else.34 As such, it takes them from their original contexts and 
throws them into a cultural marketplace where they can be superficially 
embraced without being actually put into practice.
The heart of  the commodification process is found in places such 
as the sprawling Tanah Abang market in metropolitan Jakarta, where 
countless tightly packed stalls are festooned with products from small 
to middle scale industries. These industries also operate in provincial 
towns such as Tasikmalaya, Pekalongan and Solo. They not only meet 
market demands, but also set market trends nationally. This reciprocal 
relationship is driven by business intuition and acumen rather than 
religious motivation. This ‘Islamic industry’ thrives in parallel with the 
emergence of  upwardly mobile consumers, who seek models of  behavior 
appropriate to their new elevated status. But the end result is determined 
by those on the economic margins who “show a fascination with the 
cultural codes associated with the wealth and power of  the new elites.”35
The sprouting of  Islamic symbols in Indonesian provincial towns is 
almost identical to the success of  the middle class in expanding business. 
In Kebumen, many people have been able to open stores along Sutoyo, 
Kolopaking and Kusuma streets, selling mobile phones, electronic 
gadgets, ready-made garments and much more. Market competition 
has been enlivened by the entry of  new players, kyais or young figures 
who are closely affiliated with the biggest Islamic organizations in 
Kebumen, NU and Muhammadiyah. One of  them, Wahib Machfudz, 
owns a number of  stores under the label Al-Huda, the same name as 
his pesantren, selling books, clothing and electronic accessories, as well 
as several telephone shops. Another successful businessman, Cholidi 
Ibhar, is a former local parliamentarian from the Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa/PKB (Party of  Nation Awakening) in Kebumen. He specializes 
34 Vincent J. Miller, Consuming Religion: Christian Faith and Practice in a Consumer 
Culture (New York: Continuum, 2004).
35 Ken Young, “Consumption, Social Differentiation and Self-Definition of  
the New Rich,” p. 57.
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in selling Muslim fashion under his own label Amanah, in competition 
with similar shops such as Tadzkiya, Zahra, Mangga Dua, Tiara 27, and 
Asri. As well as these retailers, several young NU and Muhammadiyah 
activists such as Slamet Faisol and Muhammad Dahsyad have become 
wholesale clothing supply agents to small retail stores throughout 
Kebumen. Other prominent business players with santri backgrounds 
have arisen in Kebumen to creatively broaden the market coverage of  
local commodities. Among them are Yahya Mustafa, Ibnu Ashari, Mastur 
Soba’i A ziz, Ayub, and Slamet Faisol. Yahya Mustafa has become the 
most prominent of  them all by expanding basket weaving craftwork for 
export, and was given the (bank) Danamon Award for his hard work. 
Another success story is that of  Ibnu Ashari, now the owner of  Sriti 
plastic cutting factory located in Kelurahan Watubarut, Kebumen. This 
entrepreneur has an NU background, and was once active in Ansor and 
Garda Bangsa Kebumen (2002-2007). He opened his own factory after 
working for ten years in the Naga Semut plastic factory, owned by the 
Chinese entrepreneur Tan Han Jian.36
The establishment of  the Sentral Ekonomi Muslim (SEM/Centre 
of  Muslim Economy), in Sutoyo Street near Tumenggungan traditional 
market, is emblematic of  the emerging middle class enterpreneurs in 
Kebumen, which has witnessed a marked shift in class formation. In 2004, 
SEM was built on land donated to the Darussalam Mosque, situated in 
Kebumen sub-district. In cooperation with an investor, 68 kiosks were 
built but unfortunately not more than 10 kiosks in the front row were 
able to stay in business. The remaining kiosks were closed, or never even 
opened. A lot of  effort has gone into invigorating this market, mostly 
to settle the debts of  the wholesalers who invested Rp 1.2 billion for 
construction of  the kiosks.37 Initially SEM was be a convenient shopping 
centre where the emerging middle class in Kebumen could spend their 
money and meet their growing need for ‘Islamic’ clothing and accessories, 
thus strengthening their class distinction. However since it was not 
modelled after luxurious shopping malls in Yogyakarta and other cities 
in Central Java, SEM never evolved into an important shopping centre 
36 Interview with Ibnu Ashari, 14 January 2008. 
37 Interview with Nurhadi, member of  Nadzir Darussalam Mosque, 17 March 
2008.
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bringing pride to Kebumen society. This fact indicates that marketing 
Islamic commodities by itself  is not enough – they need to be marketed 
in the modern way, and not through kiosks in a traditional market.
In the middle of  SEM’s failure, the Jadi Baru Mall (JB) was built, 
despite opposition from the traditional traders and Chinese businessmen 
of  Kebumen. JB belongs to a supermarket network centred in the 
Kroya, Cilacap. It was built by an entrepreneur from Cilacap, Mahasin, 
the besan (relationship between parents whose children are married to 
each other) of  an influential cleric, Gus Anam, from Leler Banyumas. 
The construction of  JB was supported by local Kebumen public figures. 
One of  them, Yazid Machfudz, is the brother of  Wahib Machfudz, the 
chairman of  the consultative council of  the NU branch of  Kebumen 
and a businessman. There has long been a tight bond between Mahasin 
and Yazid. Yazid was convinced that the development of  JB would bring 
prosperity to the Muslim community, because the owner is a member of  
NU and the mall would improve Kebumen’s economy by attracting new 
people and new life to a part of  town that was currently deserted.38 JB 
would have a special section for Muslim Women’s Wear, complete with 
all the accessories and gadgets needed by women who wanted to appear 
‘Islamic’ and yet modern.
The middle class’ ability to expand their business network by selling 
‘Islamic’ products is also evident in Martapura. Realizing Sekumpul’s 
market value, Guru Zaini launched Al-Zahra productions, a brand name 
for the numerous merchandise, accessories and gadgets associated with 
the Sekumpul. The core products of  Al-Zahra are Muslim fashion, 
prayer/ritual attire and accessories, with its production lines located 
in Tasikmalaya and Surabaya. Al-Zahra later expanded its production 
line with the opening of  the Ar-Ruhama bookstore and Ar-Raudhah 
publications. Both of  these businesses were put under independent 
management, and Guru Zaini focussed on Al-Zahra. Besides the ritual 
merchandise shops and Muslim women’s fashions under the umbrella of  
Gallery Al-Zahra, Al Zahra now has business lines such as Al-Zahra Fast 
Food, imitating the model of  California Fried Chicken, AZ Bakery and 
Al-Zahra Supermarket. Al-Zahra also produces its own mineral water, 
branded simply as ‘Sekumpul’.
38 Interview with Yazid Machfudz, 7 November 2007.
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Al-Zahra claims the source of  its business inspiration is Aa Gym’s 
Management Qalbu Corporation, but with Guru Zaini as a marketing 
figure to target certain market segments, particularly in provincial towns 
of  South Kalimantan. Al-Zahra’s major selling point was the fact that it 
was owned by Sekumpul, and it grew dramatically. Even after the death 
of  Guru Zaini in 2005, Al-Zahra still stands strong. Its consumers are 
the thousands of  visitors coming to Sekumpul every day. Although the 
popularity of  Sekumpul as a centre of  ritual seems to have faded slightly, 
Martapura still remains a religious and social magnet for provincial towns 
of  South Kalimantan and Sekumpul business enterprises continue to 
expand. The expansion of  Sekumpul businesses has been backed by 
many succesful enterpreneurs, including Sarkani, Norhid, Assegaf, 
and Morsade. These enterprenuers have developed various ‘Islamic’ 
type business enterprises of  their own, inspired by the Sekumpul.39 
For instance, a real estate company owned by Morsade has developed 
exclusive ‘Islamic’ residences in Banjarbaru, near Martapura, named the 
Ismor housing complex after the abbreviation of  his name.40
What we have seen here is the prominent role of  the new middle 
class as an agency to facilitate the process of  religious commodification. 
Agency here specifically refers to the capacity of  Muslims to realize 
their own interests against the dominant ideology that makes it difficult 
to reconcile piety and other forms of  public religious expression with 
modernity.41 An active engagement in the construction of  religious 
debate and discourse in the public space primarily characterizes this 
particular type of  agency, through which a new form of  interpretation 
and meaning is offered for religious expressions and identities. A 
criticism of  the religious establishment is inherent in its efforts to 
counter hegemonic discourse and passivity that characterizes religious 
traditionalism. In contrast to Mahmood’s understanding of  agency in the 
case of  the mosque’s woman movement in Egypt, which was centred on 
39 Interview with Ridwan, Former Director Al Zahra, 17 February 2008, and 
Rizki Wijayakusuma, Ahmad Diauddin and Suriani, admin staff  of  Al-Zahra, 19 Fe-
bruary 2008.
40 Interview with Ismail Morsade, Martapura, 20 January 2008.
41 On the concept of  agency, see Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of  Society. 
Outline of  the Theory of  Structuration (Cambridge: Polity, 1984); see also, his Social Theory 
and Modern Sociology (Cambridge: Polity, 1987).
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individual intentions to engage in self-transformation through passivity 
and feminine docility and not solely through the lens of  subversion, 
agency in this context involves the process of  social transformation and 
strategic choices.42 Instead of  giving up religiosity, considered as a source 
of  backwardness, it liberalizes religion from its traditionally subservient, 
passive and docile posture by turning it into a source of  moral legitimacy 
and distinction to represent a modern form of  life.
The fact that the growing trend for women in Indonesian provincial 
towns to wear headscarves is tied to the larger process of  social change 
sheds some light on the importance of  agency in the process of  
negotiation between tradition and modernity. As Brenner observed, the 
practice of  veiling among women in Java represents both a new historical 
consciousness and a transformation of  self  that challenges local tradition 
as well as Western models of  modernity. Veiling is thus perceived as an 
active process to produce a vision of  a society that is distancing itself  
from the past as it embarks upon a new modernity.43 Indeed, veiling 
allows middle-class women in Java to live away from home and move 
into predominantly male social, political and economic spaces with a 
heightened commitment to the profession of  Islam.44 In fact, the wearing 
of  the headscarf  helped Rustriningsih, the then Kebumen district head, 
to secure her position as the first woman to hold the highest political 
position in Kebumen. As well as her pioneering efforts to improve 
transparency and good governance in Kebumen, Rustriningsih’s politics 
of  veiling played a significant role in her success in winning support from 
the majority of  Kebumen society. No less significant, Rustriningsih’s 
veiled performance became a style reference and established a dress code 
42 Saba Mahmood, Politics of  Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subjects 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005). For critiques of  her theory, 
see, for instance, Farzana Haniffa, “Piety as Politics amongst Muslim Women in 
Contemporary Sri Lanka”, Modern Asian Studies 42, 2/3 (2008): 347-75; Rubina Jasani, 
“Violence, Reconstruction and Islamic Reform—Stories from the Muslim ‘Ghetto’”, 
Modern Asian Studies 42, 2/3 (2008), pp. 431-56. 
43 Suzanne Brenner, “Reconstructing Self  and Society: Javanese Muslim Women 
and ‘the Veil,’ American Ethnologist 23, 4 (1996), pp. 673-697. 
44 Nancy J. Smith-Hefner, “Javanese Women and the Veil in Post-Soeharto In-
donesia,” Journal of  Asian Studies 66, 2 (2007): 389-420; see also Deny Hamdani, “The 
Quest for Indonesian Islam: Contestation and Consensus Concerning Veiling,” PhD 
Dissertation, Australian National University: 2007. 
Noorhaidi Hasan
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2011 M/1432 H142
for many politicians, religious leaders and other members of  the middle 
class in Kebumen.45 Once Islamic attire was adopted by Kebumen’s elite 
and middle class, the koko shirt and the trendy jilbab became popular 
throughout Kebumen.
E. Islam in Local Politics
Because of  Islam’s complex relationship with tradition, locality, 
modernity, as well as globalization, it is hard to determine whether 
Indonesia has actually reached the brink of  a post-Islamist turning point. 
Such a turning point would be signaled by a shift in Islamic activism 
from collective activism that is revolutionary in character, towards an 
individual activism which accepts the imperatives of  modern life. If  
the first is shaped by ideologies, what Bayat defines as ‘post-Islamism’ 
distances itself  from political nuances and collective militancy, whilst still 
ensuring harmonization and parallelism between Islam and modernity.46 
No doubt, the reality of  an electoral democratic system that guarantees 
much broader public participation in politics, however shallow this 
participation may be, serves as a catalyst for the burgeoning of  public 
Islam. It is a concept that refers to the appearance of  an “Islamic” public 
sphere which enables a large segment of  diverse Muslims to make their 
voices heard in civic debate and public life, thus facilitating a modern 
and distinctively open sense of  political and religious identity.47 Being 
embedded in a combination of  both public display and public discourse, 
public Islam constitutes an ordering and rationalizing that is expressed in 
Islamic terms but coheres in a unified normative principle. In so doing, 
it plays a significant role in channelling social change, securing social 
order and promoting grass-roots democratisation in Muslim societies.48 
45 Interview with Dawamuddin Masdar, an NU leader in Kebumen, Kebumen, 
9 January 2008.
46 Asef  Bayat, Making Islam Democratic, Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 10-11.
47 Armando Salvatore and Dale Eickelman, “Public Islam and the Common 
Good,” in Armando Salvatore and Dale F. Eickleman (eds.), Public Islam and the Common 
Good (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2004), pp. xi-xxv.
48 Armando Salvatore, “The Genesis and Evolution of  ‘Islamic Publicness’ 
under Global Constraints,” Journal of  Arabic, Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies 3, 1 
(1996), pp. 51-70.
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In other words, public Islam is a process that sheds some light on the 
significance of  religion in the dynamics of  public life of  contemporary 
Muslim societies.
The increase in the public visibility of  religion in today’s politics 
is actually not unique to Muslims. As Casanova has argued, religions 
in the globalizing era have entered the public sphere and the arena of  
political contestation to participate in the very struggles to define and set 
the modern boundaries between the private and public sphere, between 
system and life-world, between family, civil society and state, between 
nations, states, civilizations and the world system.49 It is the era when the 
wall of  secularization separating the secular and religious realms—which 
entails the privatization of  religion—breaks down and faces a serious 
challenge.50 For Casanova, the appearance of  religions in the public spaces 
of  the globalizing era facilitates a new institutionalization of  processes 
of  practical rationalization and thus the fading boundaries between the 
private and the public. By entering the sphere of  public communication, 
religions are induced to a ‘reflexive rationalization’ of  the lifeworld, 
which entails a reconfiguration of  the private-public dichotomy and of  
its boundaries.51
The burgeoning of  public Islam is related to the rapid current of  
modernization and globalization and the nation’s on-going democratic 
consolidation. Following the shift towards a consumerist society as a 
result of  globalization, religion is experiencing commodification as piety 
becomes part of  the drama of  self  identity and representation, and the 
statement of  the self  in the public space. As an alternative to religious 
radicalism, it offers Muslims a way to actualize religious beliefs and values 
while still following the path of  modernity and globalization, without 
plunging into violence and joining a cycle of  militancy. Democratic 
values, which form the foundations of  practical Islam and the politics of  
contemporary Muslim society, suggest that being a democratic Muslim 
is no longer an oxymoron.52
49 Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of  
Chicago Press, 1994), p. 6.
50 Ibid., pp.11-19.
51 Ibid., pp. 228-229.
52 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “The Rise of  ‘Muslim Democracy’.” Journal of  Democracy 
16, 2 (2005), pp. 13-27.
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The complex relationship between Islam and democracy is made 
manifest when its symbols have assumed a greater significance in the 
dynamics of  local politics. The importance of  religious symbols in 
local politics lies in their ability to legitimize elites in power and their 
collaborators in their attempt to respond to the challenges of  the 
opposition, including militant Islamists. This has led those in power to 
appropriate religious symbols and Islamist idioms, for the instrumental 
purposes of  claiming the mantle of  Islam and delegitimizing the Islamist 
opposition, while simultaneously producing a greater harmony of  state-
society relations.53 By mobilizing religious symbols, new political elites 
from the santri background, who have links to prominent ‘ulama and 
their pesantren, were involved in negotiations for boundaries in terms 
of  political power, economic arrangements, as well as the redefinition 
of  group identities. Interestingly, when a multiplicity of  actors have the 
opportunity to interpret symbols differently, in accordance with their 
own interests, Islamist attempts to dominate the interpretation of  those 
symbols, and thereby transform the Indonesian secular democratic 
system into an Islamic state, have increasingly lost ground. In this process 
religious symbols have irrefutably been distanced from their religious 
moorings and narrow, Islamist understandings, in favor of  pragmatic 
political purposes.
This phenomenon often looks like a paradox. Democracy requires 
a liberation of  public spaces from the domination of  narrow religious, 
ethnic and primal sentiments. If  these were to resurface in the political 
arena they could affect the very process of  democratic consolidation. But 
on the other hand, religious symbols may play a pivotal role in political 
mobilization. They can legitimize the ruling elite and provide the means 
for them to counter and deligitimize their opposition, including militant 
Islamists. The situation is rendered more complex by the fact that 
democracy cannot deny interest groups access to those same symbols, 
which can then be used to pursue narrow, group-specific interests. In 
exchange for support in local elections, for instance, regional political 
leaders may well exploit religious symbols and align themselves with the 
53 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Islamic Leviathan. Islam and the Making of  State Power 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 106. For the context of  Malaysia, see Jo-
seph Chinyong Liow, Piety and Politics. Islamism in Contemporary Malaysia (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), pp. 11-12.
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religious majority in decision-making. By ignoring the basic principles of  
democracy, regional autonomy can become more corrupt and exploitative 
than the highly centralized government of  the New Order, and thus 
become a stumbling block to achieving the public good.
When Indonesia adopted regional autonomy and Jakarta 
decentralized many, but not all, of  its political and financial powers, the 
matrix of  power relations became more complex. The nexus between the 
interests of  regional elites, resource competition and ethnic-cum-religious 
divisions seems to have driven the dynamics of  local politics in Indonesia’s 
many different regions. All these phenomena are in fact symptoms of  the 
weakening of  the central state, which interestingly does not automatically 
result in more democratization, good governance and the strengthening 
of  civil society. As Nordholt and van Klinken have shown, despite the 
process of  decentralization, political and economic development at the 
regional level seemed doomed. Its process is challenged by bureaucratic 
sabotage, corrupt power politics, short term opportunism, and the 
absence of  a widely shared vision of  the future. Moreover, the relative 
weakness of  civil society has accompanied the emergence of  new forms 
of  authoritarian rule and the continuity of  the existing patrimonial 
patterns. Particular bureacratic and political elites mobilized ethnic-cum-
religious sentiments to achieve their goals.54 It should be noted, however, 
that approaching the issue from a linear model of  democratization, these 
authors are apparently more tempted to underscore the paradoxes of  
decentralization in post-Suharto Indonesia at the expense of  the more 
nuanced dynamics of  the process itself.
The case of  Kebumen is again worth noting in this context. 
Rustriningsih represents the ability of  the middle class to make use of  
religious symbols, ideologies and solidarities and give them multiple 
interpretations to legitimize their own claims at a time when democratic 
idioms have increasingly gained ground in Indonesian provincial 
towns. As a successful, thirty-five year old woman wearing a colourful 
headscarf  and a fashionable two-piece suit, with a long skirt, for her 
public performances, Rustriningsih’s new image spoke loudly of  the 
54 Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken, “Introduction”, in Henk 
Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken (ed.), Renegotiating Boundaries Local Politics in 
Post-Suharto Indonesia (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007), pp. 1-29.
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compatibility of  Islam with modernity. She responded to the harsh 
critiques of  her Islamist rivals, especially those in the Front Thariqatul 
Jihad (FTJ), who questioned her abangan background as being unfriendly 
to Islam. She also challenged the Islamist and conservative Muslim 
rejection of  women in public spaces and their right to political positions 
in the male dominated region in Kebumen. The wearing of  a headscarf  
certainly did not indicate Rustriningsih’s agreement with the Islamist 
agenda, by which public moral order and personal behavior should be 
governed according to the precepts of  militant Islamist ideology. It can 
be seen instead as evidence of  the gender struggle to reconstruct the 
segregating social norms that subordinate women. Thus Rustriningsih 
was exercising public agency to deconstruct social taboos, and to 
reconfigure the collective social imagination to accept that being a good 
Muslim woman does not require withdrawal from public spaces and 
social relations. Becoming a good Muslim woman may instead mean 
having the courage to stand tall in public, and to lead others through 
change for the better. Once Rustriningsih started wearing a headscarf  
she no longer hesitated to talk about good governance, democracy, and 
poverty reduction.
The importance of  religious symbols in the dynamics of  local 
politics following Suharto’s demise appears also to be linked to incremental 
efforts by district and municipal level governments to redefine their 
regional identities. Suharto’s highly centralized New Order government 
discouraged real regional identity, and maintained close control over 
the resources of  the nation’s various regions, as well as their political 
and economic development. In fact, “the New Order government was 
ethnocentrically controlled by the Javanese, and therefore, all forms 
of  Javanese culture were supported and underpinned the regime’s 
cultural policies and imaginings.”55 This ‘Javanization’ of  Indonesia was 
increasingly seen as exerting a stranglehold on the lives of  the Indonesian 
people. Especially outside Java, there were many who felt that they had 
never really enjoyed the fruits of  30 years of  New Order development, 
but instead bore the brunt of  corruption, collusion and nepotism from 
55 Kendra Clegg, “The Politics of  Redefining Ethnic Identity in Indonesia: 
Smothering the Fires in Lombok with Democracy,” in Nicholas Tarling and Edmund 
Terence Gomez (eds.), The State, Development and Identity in Multi-Ethnic Societies. Ethnicity, 
Equity and the Nation (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 177. 
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the centre.56 Law No. 22/1999 on local autonomy was therefore welcomed 
with enthusiasm. This law drastically limited the authority of  the central 
government, and devolved considerable authority to district governments, 
thereby strengthening the position of  the local government at the district 
and municipal levels.57 Despite the fact that regional, religious, and ethnic 
identity politics assumed much greater importance,58 decentralization 
is widely recognized as a major and necessary step towards nurturing a 
flourishing democracy by giving space for people to participate in local 
political processes.59
Local elite political groups adopted a range of  strategies to redefine 
and strengthen regional identity as a means of  increasing their electoral 
support. As well as reinventing historical legacies and memories, they 
mobilized religious symbols and other forms of  cultural capital, including 
support from the ‘ulama. As is evident in the case of  Martapura, Rudy 
Ariffin sought to secure sympathy and support from the ‘ulama shortly 
after he was elected as the district head in 2000. The most charismatic 
‘ulama in Martapura, Guru Zaini, did not initially support Ariffin and his 
running partner Mawardi Abbas. Guru Zaini’s support was enormously 
important. As the murshid (Sufi adept) of  the Sammaniyah Sufi Order, 
he had wide influence among Muslims throughout Kalimantan. Ariffin 
made all-out efforts to persuade Guru Zaini. His relentless efforts were 
blessed with a stroke of  good luck when he was made responsible for 
arranging President Abdurrahman Wahid’s visit to Sekumpul in 2001, 
thus providing him a golden opportunity to make closer contact with 
56 Priyambudi Sulistiyanto and Maribeth Erb, “Introduction: Entangled Poli-
tics in post-Suharto Indonesia,” in Maribeth Erb, Priyambudi Sulistiyanto and Carole 
Faucher (eds.), Religionalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia (London and New York: Routledge, 
2005), pp. 1-17.
57 Pratikno, “Local Autonomy and Democracy in Indonesia, 1999-2001,” in 
Maribeth Erb, Priyambudi Sulistiyanto and Carole Faucher (eds.), Religionalism in Post-
Suharto Indonesia (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 21-35.
58 Henk Schulte Nordholt and van Klinken, “Introduction,” in Renegotiating 
Boundaries Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia, pp. 1-29.
59 Priyambudi Sulistiyanto and Maribeth Erb, “Indonesian and the Quest for 
Democracy,” in Maribeth Erb and Priyambudi Sulistiyanto (eds.), Deepening Democracy in 
Indonesia? Direct Elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada) (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009), pp. 1-37.
Noorhaidi Hasan
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2011 M/1432 H148
Guru Zaini.60
Ariffin’s drive to reinforce the image of  Martapura as the front 
porch of  Mecca underpinned his proposal to enact shari‘a by-laws. For 
the political elite of  Martapura, the complete congruence of  Islam 
and Banjarese culture is unrefutable. Referring to the thesis proposed 
by local anthropologist Alfani Daud, the main concept underlying the 
by-laws is that “Islam is Banjar and Banjar is Islam.” In his opinion, 
however, the pressures of  rapid modernization and globalization and 
Jakarta-centric development had resulted in the fading influence of  
Islam as the most important source of  reference among the Banjarese 
people. As a consequence, social problems and moral diseases such as 
gambling, adultery, drug addiction and other forms of  ‘vice’ had spread 
widely, especially among Martapura’s younger generation. He argued that 
this problem is of  concern not only to the government, but also ‘ulama 
and ordinary citizens, and thus urged the local government to enact the 
by-laws.61
Matters assumed a greater urgency when a paramilitary organi-
zation, Garusikat (the Movement of  Muslims to Remove Social Ills), 
was established with support from such conservative ‘ulama as Anang 
Jazouly Seman, and actively took to the streets calling for the shari>’a.62 
Its organizational structure and operational concept were proposed by 
Badru ’Ain Sanusi al-Afif, a former NGO activist who was also active in 
advocacy programs. A daring religious teacher, Suhaimi, was appointed as 
the group’s commander, backed-up by former influential thugs, including 
Hasan Sinso. The police saw Garusikat as a challenge to their authority, 
and eventually responded by sponsoring the establishment of  a similar 
organization named Dalas Hangit under the leadership of  Utuh Hirang, 
another former thug. There was considerable tension between the two 
groups, resulting in actual conflict. They only reached peaceful agreement 
60 Interview with Anang Armawan, former bupati candidate, Martapura, 10 
February 2008, and with Fauzan Saleh, the Chairman of  the Executive Council of  NU 
branch in Martapura, 13 February 2008. 
61 Interview with Mashuri, former chief  of  the social office and now of  the 
economic office at the Banjar regency, 16 February 2008.
62 Interview with Mawardi Abbas, Martapura, 16 February 2008.
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after mediation by Guru Zaini.63
The shari>‘a by-laws allowed Ariffin to systematically locate Islam 
at the epicentre of  the town’s bureaucratic orbit. What has been called 
the bureaucratization of  Islam has taken place through a conscious 
decision to Islamize the government and adopt policies to achieve this 
end.64 When Martapura started promulgating shari>’a by-laws, every part 
of  the bureaucratic machinery began competing to demonstrate its 
superior commitment to Islam. All manner of  bureaucratic cogs in the 
government wheel became active in organizing religious lectures and other 
religious activities. To strengthen his policy of  Islamizing the bureaucracy, 
Ariffin then issued a circular letter recommending that all woman civil 
servants in the Banjar administration and related institutions throughout 
the region wear headscarves. Although this only had the strength of  a 
recommendation, the letter made no allowance for women working in 
government offices who happened to be Christian, Hindu or Buddhist. 
They should all wear headscarves. They were made to feel uncomfortable 
if  they did not wear headscarves in their interactions with superiors or 
other civil servants.65
When Khairul Saleh replaced Ariffin, the policy of  redefining 
regional identity and Islamizing the bureaucracy by insisting on the need 
for shari>‘a by-laws continued unabated. He ratified a proposal by the local 
legislators for a regulation requiring the insertion of  Jawi (Malay-Arabic) 
script on office nameplates in all Martapura’s government offices. He 
claimed that this policy was part of  his drive to disseminate the Islamic 
ethos throughout all government units and offices in the region, an ethos 
that packages the internalization of  piety, honesty, and good performance. 
His rationale was that the Jawi script uses the Arabic alphabet to write 
the Malay language, and that this script was once common in the Banjar 
sultanate and other Malay Islamic kingdoms. Its significance for Saleh 
was that the Jawi script is identical to the alphabet of  the Qur’an, which 
63 Interview with Rizki Wijayakusuma, former NGO activist, Martapura, 19 
February 2008.
64 On the notion of  the bureaucratization of  Islam and how this policy has 
begun to work out especially in the context of  Malaysia under Mahathir’s government, 
see Liow, Piety and Politics, pp. 46-48.
65 Interview with Masnur Manurung, a Christian woman civil servant in the 
Banjar regional administration office, 12 February 2008.
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is the ultimate guide to Muslim behaviour in both public and private 
life.66 Saleh is known as a qari (Qur’anic reciter in rhythmic tones), and 
he intersperses his public speeches or briefings with fluent quotations 
from the Qur’an and the Prophetic Traditions (h}adith). Reinforcing Islam’s 
public voice in Martapura’s bureacratic sphere, Salawat (salutation to 
the Prophet Muhammad) and Qur’anic verses, rather than patriotic and 
national songs, are often used as interludes at important government 
events. Every morning civil servants in the Banjar regency listen to a short 
sermon, piped into their offices, on the importance of  such virtues as 
piety, transparency, honesty, and the ethos of  meritocracy for the success 
of  regional development - laced with Qur’anic quotations. 
F. Conclusion
The mushrooming of  Islamic symbols in the public spaces of  
Indonesian provincial towns after Suharto occurs alongside significant 
shifts in social, economic and political fields, due to the mounting impact 
of  Islamization, social mobility, economic growth, and democratization 
occurring among town people. It is as if  we see a parallel move between 
Islamization, modernization, globalization as well as democratization, 
although key concepts associated with these trends are appropriated 
along with those rooted in tradition and local culture to inform the whole 
dynamics of  Indonesian provincial towns today. This is the main feature 
of  the provincial towns that attempt to negotiate the global and the local 
smoothly. The key player in this process is the new middle class, who 
look to Islam for inspiration both to claim distinction and social status 
and to legitimize their consumptive lifestyle. They are newly pious who 
act as active negotiators between the global and the local as well as the 
cosmopolitan centre and the hinterland. They also play a pivotal role 
as an agency that liberalizes religion from its traditionally subservient, 
passive and docile posture by turning it into a source of  moral legitimacy 
and distinction to represent a modern form of  life.
The growing interest of  the middle class in a market-friendly 
Islam-based lifestyle has spread to a large and diverse segment of  
Indonesian Muslims, including those on the economic margins who show 
66 Interview with Khairul Saleh, the Regent of  Banjar, Martapura, 21 February 
2008.
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a fascination with the cultural codes associated with the wealth and power 
of  the new elites. The expansion of  market demands and opportunities 
for commercial products related to Islam facilitates the phenomenon of  
religious commodification, which is very much related to the way religion 
is packaged and offered to a broader audience. The role of  the middle 
class is crucial as both loyal consumers as well as commercial agents, 
widely distributing the latest trends in ‘Islamic’ products into remote areas 
in the contryside. They are at the forefront in transforming Islam into 
a symbolic commodity which is not totally uprooted from tradition and 
culture, but relevant to upwardly mobile consumer demands for lifestyle, 
modesty and enjoyment. The end result of  this process is determined 
by the way in which Indonesian provincial towns are willing to distance 
themselves from the past as they embark upon a new modernity.
Given its intimate relationship with locality, tradition, modernity 
as well as globalization, Islam has increasingly assumed a greater 
importance for local politics. Political elites have used Islamic symbols 
for the instrumental purpose of  extending their political legitimacy and 
mobilizing constituency support, in a political environment of  open 
competition and increased public participation in decision making. In 
this process, religious symbols have irrefutably been distanced from 
their religious moorings and narrow, Islamist understandings, in favor of  
pragmatic political purposes. Thus the adoption of  the headscarf  (jilbab) 
by Kebumen’s district head, Rustriningsih, in her official performance 
remains an empty gesture, or even a middle-class elitist symbol, unless 
the jilbab has become an authentic expression of  her lifestyle. Seen from 
a similar perspective, the application of  shari’>a bylaws in Martapura is 
best understood not as evidence of  the growing influence of  Islam in 
politics, but rather as the maneuverings of  the town’s political elites in 
their efforts to secure their own interests. The bylaws nonetheless allowed 
the elites to systematically attempt to locate Islam at the heart of  the 
town’s bureaucratic orbit. The growing realpolitik relevance of  Islam at 
the local context has facilitated its emergence as a source of  legitimacy 
for Indonesian provincial towns’ struggle for regional development and 
modernization, while maintaining their connection with tradition and 
local culture.
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